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I.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
A.
1.

The Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion in Refusing
to Continue Trial of the Case is Established by
the Franchisee's Failure to Even Address, Let
Alone Rebut, the Franchisor's Claim that the Franchisee Acted in Bad Faith in Withholding Accounting Documents Crucial to the Case.

The record
withheld

for

ARGUMENT.

establishes that the Franchisee

tactical

accounting documents.

advantage

three

categories

purposely

of

crucial

The Franchisee himself acknowledges the

vital importance of these documents: "[t]he 4,000 plus accounting
exhibits are the core of the wrongs in this case. . . . "
lee's Brief at 72) .

(Appel-

The Miller Report was not produced until 27

days before trial, and only then after the Franchisee's counsel
broke several promises to produce the Report €>arlier and after
the Court formally compelled its production

(R. 2623-24, 2685).

Portions of the Miller Work Papers were produced only 18 days
before trial

(R. 2685).

Most of the Franchisee Work Papers—

although in existence more than three months before trial—were
not produced until 11 days before trial.

(R. 2686-87).

And even

by the morning trial began, the Franchisee had still failed to
produce some of the Franchisee Work Papers.

(R. 2701-03).

It is this pattern of dilatory, patchwork production of
"core"

accounting

documents

that
-2-

prompted

the

Franchisor

to

charge in its brief that "[i]n retrospect, there can be no real
dispute that the Franchisee's counsel repeatedly misrepresented
the existence, nature and extent of these documents."
lant's Brief at 23) .

(Appel-

Notably, the Franchisee completely failed

in his brief to address or even attempt to rebut this charge.
His failure to do so is an admission that he acted in bad faith
in delaying production of documents crucial to his case.

Under

Utah law, the absence of good faith by the party resisting a
requested continuance is a decisive factor governing a court's
decision to continue trial of the case.

Christenson v. Jewkes,

761 P.2d 1375, 1377, n. 2 (Utah 1988).
Recognizing

the

serious

jeopardy

in which the

trial

court's decision to deny the requested continuance is placed by
the Franchisee's undisputed bad faith, the Franchisee advances
eight reasons why his
Papers

was

not

failure to produce the Franchisee Work

prejudicial.

(Appellee's

Brief

at

28, 29).

Wholly apart from the obvious fact that these "explanations" are
confined solely to the Franchisee Work Papers and do not even
address the Franchisee's reasons for not producing the Miller
Report and the Miller Work Papers, none of these explanations is
supported by any citation to the record.
cannot consider them.

-3-

The Court, therefore,

Moreover,

contrary

Franchisor did not " . . .
ance by stipulation."

to

the

Franchisee's

claim,

the

twice waive the motion for a continu-

(Appellee's Brief at 27). To support that

claim, the Franchisee cites two portions of the record, Tr. at
R. 5237-44 and 5280-81.

These citations, however, pertain solely

to proceedings conducted near the end of trial—four trial days
after the Franchisor pleaded for a continuance before the jury
was empaneled.

(R. 2677-89, 2701-03; Tr. at R. 4269-86).

These

later proceedings have no connection with, or probative effect
on, the merits of the Franchisor's forceful, abundantly supported
and unqualified pre-trial request for continuance.
Because

the

trial

court

denied

the

Franchisor's

request, the Franchisor was forced to proceed to trial.

It was

not until the fourth day of trial that the Franchisee offered and
the Franchisor objected to the trial court's receipt in evidence
of the Franchisee Work Papers.

(Tr. at R. 5229-36) .

At that

point, the court overruled the objection, Tr. at R. 52 37, but
allowed the Franchisor's counsel to defer for three days (including an intervening weekend) his cross-examination of the Franchisee's accounting expert.

(Tr. at R. 5237-38).

Forced to defend

a trial that he was not ready to begin, but grateful for the
trial court's offer to temporarily defer cross-examination, the
Franchisor's counsel did what any prudent advocate would do: he

-4-

acceded to the trial court's view that a three-day continuance be
granted.

(Tr. at R. 5243-44) .

To equate that decision—a deci-

sion made on the fourth day of trial—with a voluntary waiver of
a motion argued four days earlier is tortured at best, ludicrous
at worst.

There simply is no basis for the Franchisee's claim

that the Franchisor's acceptance of a three-day continuance near
the end of trial constitutes a ". . . waive[r] of the motion for
continuance by stipulation."

(Appellee's Brief at 27).

In the final analysis, it is undisputed that the Franchisee acted in bad faith in withholding the Miller Report, the
Miller Work Papers and the Franchisee Work Papers.

It is also

undisputed that these documents were crucial to the case: they
were the sole quantitative basis for the jury's decision that the
Franchisor underpaid commissions of $35,926.06.

In the Franchi-

see's own words, the documents were "the core of the wrongs in
this case."

(Appellee's Brief at 72). As such, there can be no

doubt that the Franchisor was irrevocably prejudiced in its ability to refute the Franchisee's commission claims at trial.

The

trial court abused its discretion in not granting the Franchisor
a reasonable continuance

in which to assimilate and rebut the

Franchisee's accounting documents.

The Court should vacate the

jury's award of $35,926.06 and remand the issue of unpaid commissions for a new trial.

-5-

2.

The Jury's Contradictory Verdicts Entitle the
Franchisor to Either a New Trial or an Order
Striking the More Generalized Findings that Favor
the Franchisee.

The Franchisee admits that the jury made an "apparently
contradictory ruling" by awarding the Franchisee liquidated damages on contracts that the jury simultaneously determined were
1
unenforceable,

(Appellee's Brief at 8) .

In cin effort to sal-

vage the verdicts that favor him, the Franchisee argues that the
Court should apply Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah
App. 1990) and simply strike the jury verdicts that favor the
Franchisor.

(Appellee's Brief at 3 0) .

There are, however, at

least two problems with this approach.
First, the Franchisee failed to seek or obtain from the
jury any of the detailed information necessary to ascertain what
the jury actually intended.
that function.

In Wright, the trial judge performed

787 P.2d at 516.

court nor the parties did so.

In this case, neither the trial

That failure is fatal to the Fran-

chisee's suggestion that the trial court should have summarily
excised the jury's liquidated damages award to the Franchisor.
Second, the Franchisee ignores the fact that in this
case, the Franchisee's obligation under the Frcinchise Agreements

1

In a related context, the Franchisee argues that these verdicts created a "tremendous conflict." (Appellee's Brief at 62).
-6-
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(R. 3890) .
jury's

These jury findings are far more general than the

specific

enforce

and

finding

recover

that

the

liquidated

Franchisor

damages

for

is
the

entitled

to

Franchisee's
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The trial court erred in refusing to allow "the more

specific finding to govern the outcome."
516.

Wright, 787 P.2d

at

This Court, therefore, should either strike the more gen-

eral verdicts that favor the Franchisee or remand the case for a
new trial.
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Paragraph 8 Services.
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Brief
tin*

that
at

f hat
the

h t i : i '.
IVaneli j s e e

U1 - 11 , a r e

i \ nienei

ii Imi I I
citet:

irrelevant

.nppin I

lm

.i I I 111 Ni< ]
iiiii

to the

li i -i
issue

I d r a q r ipn
-g-

\ i p i ei * >

brief,
el

see

Appellee's

the sufficiency

"i M'M <"

iiw«e i<l

of

MM

Franchisor

readily

concedes that each of these

3 3 evidentiary

predicates constitute some support for the commission
award that the Franchisor is not challenging.

award—an

However, only six

of the 3 3 cited pieces of evidence relate to the Paragraph 8 Services award:
Franchisor

paragraph 11 (pertaining to the manner in which the

priced

its parts

and

extracted

a

so-called

"extra

materials charge"), paragraph 13 (pertaining to the Franchisor's
tracking of leads on second inspection commissions), paragraph 15
(pertaining to the amount that the Franchisor spent on advertising during one of the three years of the parties' association), 3
paragraph 21 (same), paragraph 27 (pertaining to "extra materials
charge"), and paragraph 3 0 (pertaining to the Franchisee's testimony

that

he

paid

the

Franchisor

$158,206

for

bookkeeping,

accounting and related services under the Franchise Agreement).
These are the only evidentiary predicates that pertain to the
Paragraph 8 Services award.

3

There is no provision of the Franchise Agreements that
requires the Franchisor to spend any fixed amount on any particular type of Paragraph 8 Service, including advertising.
As a
matter of law, the good faith and fair dealing principle cannot
be used to imply a contrary obligation. See Rio Algom Corp. v.
Jimco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980) ("an expressed agreement or covenant relating to a specific contract right excludes
the possibility of an implied covenant of a different or contradictory nature.") Because this is a legal issue, the Franchisor
is not obligated to marshal and explain the facts that underlie
it.
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for

unpaid

admitted

commissions),

solely

and

(iii)

Trial

Exh.

P-ll,

a

chart

for illustrative purposes, Tr. at R. 4521-22,

which summarized the Franchisee's calculations of the amounts to
which he believed he was entitled
Services.
nal

for unperformed Paragraph 8

This evidence falls fall short of creating the "ratio-

basis" required

by

Utah

law

to

support

Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983).

a

damage

award.

The award must

be vacated.
(b)

By the Terms of the Jury's Own Special Verdicts, The Award of $5,891.3 5 to the Franchisee for the Franchisor's Breach of Contract
Claims Set the Outer Limit on the Total
Amount
of Damages Recoverable
on Those
Claims.
Those Damages Can Not Be Augmented
by Resort to the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing.

The Franchisee accurately observes that ". . . as an
independent cause of action, the implied covenant of fair dealing
and good faith in contracts carries it's [sic] own right of damages."

(Appellee's Brief at 43).

What the Franchisee fails to

understand, however, is that "an expressed agreement or covenant
relating to a specific contract right excludes the possibility of
an implied covenant of a different or contradictory nature."
Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd. , 618 P.2d 497, 505

(Utah 1980).

Rio
In

other words, "there is no violation of the duty of good faith, as
a

matter

of

law,

wiien

a

party
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is

simply

exercising

its

contractua ] r i ghts."

Howe _ v.
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829

]992 )
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faiNIi
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the Franchise Aqree---

oi

dealing

damages

right
i ,/u

through

.in

of

breach

of

< • 1 a i in b e c a u s e

for

Such

his

breach

a

< I a i ni

\ recovery

'i nS ,

i 111

l.o

already
violates

|m ir y •

i 1111

i 11

$ b r 8 9 1 , ] h on the breach of contract c l a i m s cannot be s u p p l e m e n t e d
by resort

to t h e covenant

of g o o d

f a i t h a n d l a i r d e a ] ii lg.

This

a d d J i in i m a 1 I mas i s I r a \ ac a t L nq t h e pi hn nil in

i

T h e F r a n c h i s o r is t h e " P r e v a i l i n g Party71' on t h e
P a r t i e s ' B r e a c h of C o n t r a c t C l a i m s f o r _ P u r p o s e s of

4

Recovering His Attorneys/ Fees.
T1 I e
"

F i: a n c h i s e e

c o r r e c t .1 y

s t a. t e s

t ii e

p a r t y i n whose favor the 'net' judgment is entered becomes

the preva i.,1 1 ng party, " enti t] ed to attorney's fees.
Bri ef e t * 18)
that

o i I .] y

11 I a t

/:j

[h] i s

Franchisee

( A.ppel 1 ee' s

W':i I::l: I i: i ::: am: :i,a.] y s:i s , .1: lowev ei: , t:,l le F ranchisee s bates

[ total ] damages were
nowhere

di f f p r ° n t i a t e s

1 i.i s b r e a c h c • f contraci

$9] , 000
between

:

Ii i d o i n g

damages

so, the

a] 3 ocab] e tc:

j.ains an.d d.a.mages a 1 1 oca,b] e t o hi s toi: t
-.] 3

claims.

This

allocation

is

crucial:

the

Franchisee's

total
5
recovery for breach of the Franchise Agreements is $5,891.35;

5

The Franchisee offers no analysis to support its apparent
view that the $50,000 award for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing constitutes a part of its total
recovery for breach of contract.
For at least three reasons,
these damages sound in tort.
First, the Franchisee pleaded his implied covenant claim in
tort; he even sought the imposition of punitive damages on this
claim, R. 1366(a), clearly disclosing the tort nature of his
claim.
See e.g. Gaqon v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. , 775
P.2d 325 (Utah 1988).
(". . . a plaintiff is not entitled to put
on evidence of punitive damages unless he or she can make out a
sufficient case to go to the jury on an independent tort theory .")
Second, under applicable California law, if five characteristics are satisfied, breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair deailing sounds in tort. According to Wallis v.
Superior Ct. , 160 Cal. App. 3rd 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Cal.
1984), these characteristics are:
(1)

the contract must be such that the parties are in
inherently unequal bargaining positions;

(2)

the motivation for entering the contract must be a
non-profit motivation, i.e. , to secure peace of
mind, security, future protection;

(3)

ordinary
contract
damages
are not adequate,
because (a) they do not require the party in the
superior position to account for its action, and
(b) they do not make the inferior party "whole";

(4)

one party is especially vulnerable because of the
type of harm it may suffer and of necessity places
trust in the other party to perform; and

(5)

the other party is aware of this vulnerability.

Footnote continued on next page.
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Foot not"P coiit:, i rim- Il I i om pi e1 l :i oi is p a g e .
A l t h o u g h t h e C a l i f o r n i a S u p r e m e Court held in Foley v.
I n t e r a c t i v e Data Corp. , 7 65 P. 2d 3 73 (Cal. 1988) that t h e usua 1
e m p l o y m e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p does n o t normal ly e x h i b i t these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , a t least t h r e e p o s t - F o l e y cases interpret Foley t o
c h a r a c t e r i z e a n Implied, covenant claim, a s sounding in tort s o
long a s t h e p a r t i e s a r e i n a. fiduciary r e l a t i o n s h i p .
Mitsui
M f r s . Bank v. Superior C t . , 2 60 C a l . R p t r . 793, 7 9 5-9 6 (Cal. A p p .
1989) ("Foley, impliedly if n o t e x p r e s s l y , li m i t s t h e abili ty t o
r e c o v e r t o r t d a m a g e s in breach, o f contract s i t u a t i o n s t o those
w h e r e t h e r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s o f t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s have
t h e fiduciary c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f that r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e
insurer and i n s u r e d . " ) ; C a r e a u & C o , v. Security P a c i f i c B u s i n e s s
C r e d i t , Inc. , 222 Ca 1. A p p . 3rd 1371 (Ca 11 A p p . 19 9 0) (Foley
". .
d i d suggest that i t i s still a n open q u e s t i o n a s t o
whether* 'the special i: el a t i o n s h i p m o d e l i s a n a p p r o p r i a t e o n e t o
follow in d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t o expand tort r e c o v e r y . ' " ) ; Price
v. W e l l s - F a r q o B a n k , 2.13 C a ] A p p . 3rd 4 65, 2 6.2 C a l . R p t r . 73 5
(Cal. A p p . 1.989) (''until t h e Supreme Court says o t h e r w i s e , j t m a y
st i 1 1. b e argued that a n o n - i n s u r a n c e c o n t r a c t w a s "tort i ous ly
b r e a c h e d if it contained c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s similar t o t h o s e wh,i ch
allow a findi ng of t o r t i o u s breach in an i n s u r a n c e contract.")
In this c a s e , tl: le jury d e t e r m i n e d that t h e F r a n c h i s e A g r e e m e n t s created a fiduciary r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s .
(R. 3.233). T h e F r a n c h i s e e himself testi fied t h a t he. entered into
t h e F r a n c h i s e A g r e e m e n t s t o obtain security and p e a c e of m i n d .
(Tr. a t R. 4 5 5 7 - 5 8 ) .
A c c o r d i n g l y , it appears that t h e $50,000
award for b r e a c h o f t h e impli ed covenant of good, faith and fa ir
dealing sounds m tort a n d m a y n o t b e included in reckoning the
net success of the p a r t i e s on t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e breach of contract
clai m s .
At
_
\ .-• • this issue should b e remanded t o t h e
t r i a l court ior a spec i : ; • ! i -iir-.n a^- t -.. r.hn- p r e c i s e com.pos.iti on
of this award.

to all attorneys' fees reasonably incurred on those claims.

The

amount of such fees should be determined on remand.
5.

The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Enforce the
Notes Against the Franchisee.

The Franchisee does not dispute in his brief that he
signed

and

delivered

three

Notes

in

the

aggregate

principal

amount of $115,000; that it was stipulated that the Franchisor
had established a prime facie case for the imposition of liability on the Notes in a sum equal to $115,000 less all proven payments; and that the trial court never explained its rationale for
denying

the

(Appellee's

Franchisor's
Brief

at

motion

49-51).

for

judgment

Rather,

the

on

the

Notes.

Franchisee

lamely

observes that:
[The Franchisor] should be forced by this
Court to answer if it has resold the territories that are the subject of the purchase by
the Notes. If [the Franchisor] has this is a
moot issue.
It is likely moot because [the
Franchisor] has the territories back under
any circumstance and can or has resold such
territories."
(Appellee's Brief at 49).
The Franchisee's response is unpersuasive and unrealistic for several reasons.

First, the Franchisee failed to produce

at trial any evidence regarding the Franchisor's efforts, if any,
to resell the franchise territories.

The absence of such evi-

dence precludes it from being considered or speculated about on

-16-

appeal
if

rani

Second, the Franchisor
tn< n impp 1 I CHI

is unawrire ot any basis on which
I N Ihi1

I 11 " M V V I M "

i ".' mi

HI . i p p n . i l

'"I'll"! i s

Court,

of n e c e s s i t y ,

menta]

f a c t u a 1 records to cur e defici encies that a party created

b e ] oto

Next.

i I'M

rltori es *:<

i s n o t i n tin* b u s i m \ s s o f q e n e i a t i nq s u p p I e -

I« I .until i set" • i

i

;l" at.emnnl

t hril

i.Mf I i <IIKIn i st-1 I < >L

iii i nnw wor't I*i $200, 000 " is unsupported

by any

citation to t h e record and nil ist b e disregarded,
F in a ] ]i

F i: a i i cl :i :i s e e c omp ] «e t e ] y f a i ] s t • ::> i: e s p o i i :i t o

I: 11: I e

the F r a n c h i s o r ' s c o n t e n t ! on that t h e F r a n c h i s e e ' s receipt of compensatory

damages

Frai ich ii sor

made

h :i m who] e under

Tl lose damages i: esu] ted

of t h e benefi t of h i s contractual
further

relieved

from

h i s contracts

with t h e

ii :i I til: le Franch isee's recei pt

bargai n

t h e ob3 i gati on

If t h e Franchisee is

of payi ng

chi ses, an i mpermi ssi I::>] e doi ib] e recovery

for hi s f ran

wi 1 1 occur.

The F r an-

c h i s e e w i ] ] n o t o n ] y r e c e i v e c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r h i s c 1 a i m e d ] o s s e s,
h e

w_i.ii

to

nav

fror

*I

p. •

. •"

f -i

vdiiL-

t h e Kr.i ' i i n s -

able.

( See

<

f

i, ,

:.**r,e b e n e t r ^

i.t p• ,

*

t h e Notei-

i pa 1

t'i tin i l l 111

ami enter
ill

• •

t

•

r i a.!

wtr

--t^r

_* <.-.i_^_ >'_ _t..u

. eu

._:_^

:

T h i s Coi u: t s h o i i l d r t v*u s t
enforce

,itj J o Hi,,.

in

I

judgment
!

J I ni I ni

court' s refusal

t u r t h e Franchisor

il I i t » M

I .

to

ii i t h e

6.

To

The Franchisee's Blatant Violation of the Golden
Rule of Trial Tactics Entitles the Franchisor to a
New Trial.
extricate

himself

from

the

fatal

effect

of

his

improper trial tactic, the Franchisee lashes out with a series of
pejorative

labels, calling

argument "frivolous."

the Franchisor

"predatory" and

(Appellee's Brief at 52).

its

The Franchi-

see's obvious defensiveness on this issue is understandable; it
is not, however, remotely responsive to the Franchisor's contention that its rights were impaired by counsel's admonition to the
jury to place itself in the Franchisee's shoes in determining
whether he was forced unfairly to go into debt under the Franchise Agreements.

The Franchisee's attempted defense of his vio-

lation of the Golden Rule trial tactic is unpersuasive.
First, the

Franchisee

suggests that his Golden

Rule

argument was directed solely to the issue of whether the Franchisee was

the victim

Agreements.

of duress

in entering

(Appellee's Brief at 52) .

into the

Franchise

The jury, however, by

being urged to place itself in the position of the Franchisee and
by hearing the trial judge endorse this as permissible "argument," was effectively given carte blanche authority to relieve
the

Franchisee

from

any

obligations

under

the

Franchise

Agreements—a result that most any juror would likely reach if
told

to

view

the

issue

solely
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from

the

perspective

of

the

Franchisee.
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objective facts are present such as (i) counsel makes a timely
objection,

(ii) counsel

instructions

are

given

seeks
to

curative

disregard

action,
the

(iii) no

improper

jury

argument,

(iv) the argument is not withdrawn by counsel, (v) the argument
is not justified in response to earlier remarks by the objecting
counsel, and
remittitur.

(vi) the trial court refuses to grant a suitable
See G. Stein, Closing Argument, § 60, at 159 (1985).

Viewed in the light of these objective facts, and given
the reality that the jury did precisely what counsel

asked—it

placed itself in the Franchisee's position and relieved the Franchisee of its contractual obligations to the Franchisor—it
clear

that

Franchisor.

the

Franchisee's

The Franchisor

tactics

unfairly

accordingly

prejudiced

is entitled

is
the

to a new

trial.
7.

The Trial Court Erred in Dissolving the Temporary
Injunction.

As an alternative to entering a permanent

injunction

consistent with the jury's findings that the Franchisor's customer list was valuable, was reasonably protected, and was illegally exploited, the trial court directed the Franchisee to make
a

so-called

"equitable payment" of $11,014 to the Franchisor.

-20-

(R. 3728) .

Charitably

stated, the trial court's action was

unorthodox and unsolicited.

At a minimum, the trial court should

be required to explain why it applied a remedy that neither party
requested and why it rejected the conventional relief that the
Franchisee

specifically

sought—the

issuance

of

a

permanent

injunction.
The Franchisor's
compelling.

The

jury

right to a permanent
specifically

injunction

determined

that

is
the

Franchisor's customer list had substantial, independent economic
value

from being

confidential; that the Franchisor

reasonably

protected the secrecy of the customer list; that the Franchisee
improperly exploited the Franchisor's customer list; and that the
Franchisor

suffered

exploitation.

significant

(R. 3192-94).

damages

as

a

result

of

that

The jury determined, therefore,

that the confidentiality provisions of the Franchise Agreements
are binding upon and

enforceable

against the

Franchisee.

As

such, the trial court erred in refusing to permanently enjoin the
Franchisee from further exploitation of the customer list.

The

Court should remand this issue with instructions either to make

6

Even the Franchisee objected to this action. (See e.g. Appellee's Brief at 70) ("Neither party requested equitable relief as
imposed by the Court. The Court came up with the solution on its
own. . . The trial court made no findings to identify any legal
standard it relied upon to justify awarding equitable relief to
[the Franchisor].")
-21-

the preliminary injunction permanent or conduct a new trial to
determine and quantify damages that the Franchisor has sustained
since the first trial.
II.
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE
A.
1.

ARGUMENT

The Trial Court Properly Refused to Require the
Franchisor to Perform and Pay for an Accounting in
Advance of Trial. To the Extent The Trial Court
Initially Erred in that Decision, the Franchisee's
Receipt of Damages for the Franchisor's Failure to
Provide the Required Accounting Services and the
Franchisee's Failure to Adduce at Trial Any Evidence of the Costs of Such Services is Fatal to
his Recovery.

The Franchisee claims that the trial court incorrectly
refused to require the Franchisor to provide an accounting
advance of trial.
claim,

the

(Appellee's Brief at 54-56) .

Franchisee

argues

that

paragraphs

in

To support that
8(c)-(e)

of

the

Franchise Agreements impose an obligation to provide an accounting

beyond

that

which

the

Franchisor

already

provided.

Id.

There are, however, at least three reasons why the Franchisee's
claim is without merit.
First, at the time the trial court denied the Franchisee's motion for an accounting—some eight months before t r i a l —
there was no factual or legal indication that the parties were in
anything other thain an arms-length commercial contract devoid of
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fiduciary

responsibilities.

In the

face of these

facts and

legal principles, the trial court allowed the Franchisee's fiduciary duty claim to go to the jury.

The jury concluded that a

fiduciary duty was owed and breached for which nominal damages of
one dollar

($1.00) were awarded.

(R. 3233a).

Once the jury

reached that conclusion, however, it was incumbent upon the Franchisee to petition the trial court to vacate or modify its earlier decision not to compel an accounting.
(".
ject

Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b)

. . the order or other form of [a previous] decision is subto

revision

at

any

time

before

the

entry

of

judgment

7

For example, the Franchisee never pleaded a claim for constructive fraud or other relief which, if established, would
shift the burden of persuasion to the Franchisor to prove the
good faith and reasonableness of its conduct, generally, and
impose an obligation to account, specifically.
Cunningham v.
Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 553 (Utah 1984); In re Swan's Estate,
293 P.2d 682, 693 (Utah 1956). Moreover, California law is settled that the relationship between a franchisor and a franchisee
is merely contractual and not fiduciary.
Boat & Motor Mart v.
Sea Ray Boats, Inc., CCH Business Franchise Guide Reporter,
5 8847 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying California law); Premier Wine &
Spirits v. E&J Gallo Winery, id. at f 9106 (9th Cir. 1988) ;
Gonsalves v. Hodgson, 237 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Cal. 1951). This is
consistent with numerous other jurisdictions.
See e.g. Mr.
Steak, Inc. v. Belveue Steak, Inc. , 555 P.2d 179, 182 (Colo.
1976) ; Adams Parker Furniture, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., CCH
Business Franchise Guide Reporter, f 9413 (D. Kan. 1987).
Finally, paragraph
the conclusion that the
ship: "This agreement
agency, joint venture
parties. . . ."

16 of the Franchise Agreements fortifies
parties were not in a fiduciary relationshall not be construed as creating an
or partnership relationship between the
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adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all
the parties.")

The

Franchisee's

failure to take this

action

constitutes a waiver of any rights it once had; that failure cannot now be rectified on appeal.
Next,

the provisions

of the Franchise Agreements

on

which the Franchisee bases its argument—paragraphs 8(c)-(e)—are
the very basis on which the jury elected to award damages of
$50,000 on the Franchisee's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
14-16,

32-35; Appellant's Reply

Brief

(See Appellant's Brief at
at 9-12,

supra).

This

award was intended to compensate the Franchisee for his supposed
failure to receive the Paragraph 8 Services.

Id.

The principal

aspect of these Services was the obligation to provide full and
accurate financial accountings.

Thus, the Franchisee's receipt

of these damages compensates it for any abridgement of his rights
under

paragraph

8

of the

Franchise

right to receive an accounting.

Agreements—including

the

To now augment that recovery

through the Franchisee's separate claim for an accounting would
result in an impermissible double recovery.
Finally,
"unbelievabl[e]"

the
that

the

Franchisee
trial

claims

court

did

that
not

it

is

require

the

Franchisor to pay for tihe Franchisee's accounting expert. (Appellee's Brief at 56).

The

trial court's decision
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is eminently

"believable," however, given the clear fact that the Franchisee
failed to adduce at trial any evidence regarding the amount, if
any, that his accountant charged or which the Franchisee paid for
Q

those services.

The absence of any factual record establishing

this vital fact is fatal to the Franchisee's effort to recover
the value, if any, of his accountant's services.
2.
The Trial Court Properly Dismissed the Franchisee's Federal and State Racketeering Claims.
As

the

Franchisee

correctly

states,

the

Franchisor

filed multiple motions to dismiss the Franchisee's federal and
state

racketeering

claims

(collectively,

Claims").

(Appellee's Brief at 57).

missal

the

of

Racketeering

(i) the Franchisee's
with particularity,

Claims

the

"Racketeering

The Franchisor sought dison

four

separate

grounds:

failure to plead the Racketeering

Claims

(ii) the Franchisee's failure to allege the

existence of a legally cognizable "enterprise," (iii) the Franchisee's failure to allege the existence of a legally cognizable
"pattern" of unlawful activity, and (iv) the Franchisee's failure
to invoke the California racketeering statute in the manner contemplated by the parties' contractual choice of law provision.
(R. 725-33).

Although the Franchisor concedes that the trial

8

The Franchisor noted this defect in its opening brief. (See
Appellant's Brief at 33-34, n.21.)
The Franchisee failed to
respond to this point in his brief.
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court's decision to dismiss the Racketeering Claims solely on the
choice of law provision is not, by itself, defensible, its decision must be affirmed if there is any other legally sufficient
basis in the record to support the decision.

Baqshaw v. Bagshaw,

788 P. 2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990) (lower court's judgment may
be affirmed if the "decision can be sustained on any proper legal
basis.") (quoting Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P. 2d 163, 169
(Utah App. 1989)).

In this case, at least three legally suffi-

cient grounds exist.
(a)

The Franchisee Failed to Plead With Particularity the Elements of a UPUAA Violation.

"Racketeering" charges, carrying as they do a powerful
stigma

and

lightly.

the

threat

of

multiple

damages, may

not

be

made

Charges of this type must be made with at least the

factual specificity required

for pleading fraud.

Accordingly,

courts consistently have applied the requirements of Rule 9(b) in
racketeering cases.
Abuse:

See generally Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO

The Allegations in Context, 1986 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 55, 90-92.

As the court in Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1299, 1306
n.55 (D. Colo. 1984) aptly noted:
A RICO defendant also needs to be protected
from unscrupulous claimants lured by the
prospect of treble damages, and it should be
the policy of the law, within the procedural
constraints of our system, to provide this
protection. . . . RICO should not be construed to give a pleader license to bully and
intimidate, nor to fire salvos from a loose
-26-

cannon.
Irresponsible or inadequately considered allegations should be met with severe
sanctions . . .
At bottom, a plaintiff's "Pavlovian inclusion of a [racketeering]
claim need not induce an equally Pavlovian acceptance of that
claim by

[the Courts. ]"

Huss v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 635 F.

Supp. 1227, 1228 (N.D. 111. 1986).
The Utah federal district court has been a leader in
applying Rule 9(b) strictly to cases involving alleged "racketeering offenses."

In Grant v. Union Bank# 629 F. Supp. 570, 576

(D. Utah 1986) , the court set forth the standard by which RICO
and analogous racketeering allegations should be judged:
[B]ecause the RICO statute is based upon
criminality it seems appropriate that the
pleadings be sufficiently particular to show
the indictability of the alleged offender.
We consider this to be an appropriate
requirement in view of the statutory language
and the far reaching sanctions of RICO.
See also Bache Halsey Stewart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank
& Trust Co. , 558 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (D. Utah 1983)

(requiring

allegations sufficient to establish "probable cause to believe
the named defendant committed the alleged predicate crimes").
Since the UPUAA similarly incorporates criminal statutes in its definition of "unlawful activity," the same pleading
standards should be applied to the state statute.

See generally

Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 645 F. Supp. 423, 425 (D. Utah

-27-

198 6) (Applying RICO pleading standards to UPUAA).

Unlike the

federal RICO statute, which does not explicitly contain a pleading requirement, the UPUAA contains a specific subsection which,
in essence, statutorily
standard.

incorporates

and

enhances Rule

9(b)'s

That section specifically requires that "the elements

of each claim or cause of action shall be stated with particularity against

each defendant."

Utah

Code Ann.

§

76-10-1605(7)

(1988 Supp.) (emphasis added).
In other words, the UPUAA specifically provides that
the particularity in pleading requirement applies to all of the
"elements of each claim or cause of action."

^d.

Thus, as to

each of the elements of its claims against the Franchisor under
the UPUAA, the Franchisee must be held to a standard of fact-specific and particularized pleading; broad-brush statements, assertions that do not differentiate among defendants, and conclusory
labels will not suffice.
this requirement

The Franchisee's failure to conform to

in his Second Amended

Complciint, R.

13 3 2-65,

justifies the trial court's dismissal of the Racketeering Claims.
(b)

The Franchisee Failed to Allege the Necessary
"Enterprise".

The Franchisees Racketeering Claims were properly dismissed for yet another, independent reason:
not plead

the existence of a separate
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the Franchisee did

"enterprise" under

the

UPUAA.

The showing of a distinct "enterprise" is indispensable

to any racketeering claim:
The central role of the concept of enterprise
under RICO cannot be overstated. It is precisely the criminal infiltration and manipulation of organizational structures that created the problems which led to the passage of
RICO.
United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 500 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986).
This

case

presents

an

"association-in-fact" enterprise.

alleged

"individual"

or

That is, the Franchisee did

not allege that the "enterprise" was some pre-existing institution or body, but rather that it consisted
defendants—the

Franchisee

manager—acting

individually,

particular purpose.
insisted

that

the

and

the

Franchisee's

in concert

(R. 1332-33).

of the

individual
district

or associating

for a

In such cases, courts have

association-in-fact

have

an

"ascertainable

structure" separate and apart from the pattern of activity in
which it allegedly engaged.
F.2d

1358, 1372

See United States v. Anderson, 62 6

(8th Cir. 1980),

cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1040

(1983) .
In United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 661, 665 (8th
Cir. 1983), the Court, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in
United

States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576

(1981), expressed the

"ascertainable structure" reguirement this way:
-29-

[A racketeering] enterprise must have an
'ascertainable structure' distinct from that
inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering activity.
This distinct structure
might be demonstrated by proof that a group
engaged in a diverse pattern of crimes or
that it has an organizational pattern or system of authority beyond what was necessary to
perpetrate the predicate crimes.
(Citations omitted).

And in United States v. Anderson, supra,

626 F.2d at 1372, that court further stated:
We hold that Congress intended that the
phrases 'a group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity," as used in
its definition of the term 'enterprise' in
[the RICO statute], to encompass only associations having an ascertainable
structure
which exist for the purpose of maintaining
operations directed toward an economic goal
that has an existence that can be defined
apart from the commission of the predicate
acts constituting the 'pattern of racketeering activity.'9

9

These holdings are in accord with other jurisdictions. See,
e.g. , Montesano v. Seaf irst Commercial Corp. , 818 F.2d 42 3, 427
(5th Cir. 1987) ("association-in-fact enterprisers, like corporate
or partnership enterprises, must have an ongoing organization or
be a continuing unit, such that the enterprise has an existence
that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate
acts"); United States v. Tillett, 763 F.2d 62:8, 631 (4th Cir.
1985); Lipin Enterprises, Inc. v. Lee, 625 F. Supp. 1098, 1099
(N.D. 111. 1985), aff'd, 803 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1986); Allinqton
v. Carpenter, 619 F. Supp. 474, 478 ( C D . Cal. 1985) ("enterprise
must have an existence 'separate and apart from the pattern of
activity in which it engaged'") (quoting Turkette, supra, 452
U.S. at 583); Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., supra, 582 F. Supp. at
1303-05 (summarizing case law).
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The UPUAA has a similar definition of "enterprise," see
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(2) (Supp. 1988), and the Utah Supreme
Court has cited the Turkette decision with approval in interpreting the enterprise

definition

in UPUAA's predecessor

statute.

See State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 637 (Utah 1988).
This requirement of "an existence separate and apart
from the pattern of racketeering activity" has been interpreted
further to require the allegation of facts demonstrating "continuity of structure or personnel."

Laterza v. American Broadcast-

ing Co., 581 F. Supp. 408, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("plaintiff's general assertion that the combination of defendants constitutes an
'enterprise' . . . without allegations as to continuity of structure

or personnel

will

be stricken

unless

supporting

factual

allegations are included in the amended complaint").
The

Franchisee's

Second

Amended

Complaint

allege any "continuity of structure or personnel."
Franchisee

failed

to

allege

an

"ascertainable structure" whatever.
the Franchisee
This

is legally

and its manager
insufficient.

enterprise

failed

to

Indeed, the

that

had

any

All that is alleged is that

formed

or are the enterprise.

The Second Amended

Complaint's

failure to adequately allege a legally cognizable "enterprise" is
yet

another

reason why the Racketeering

dismissed.
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Claims were

properly

3•

The Franchisee did not Plead Facts Sufficient to
Show That the Franchisee Engaged in any "Pattern"
of Unlawful Activity.

The "pattern" necessary to sustain a racketeering suit
involves considerably more than the commission of the requisite
three predicate offenses under the UPUAA.

Rather, as the Supreme

Court explained in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
496 n.14

(1985), the predicate offenses must be continuous and

related to one another.
As the Senate Report explained:
'The target
of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The
infiltration of legitimate business normally
requires
more
than
one
'racketeering
activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective.
It is the factor of
continuity plus relationship which combines
to produce a pattern.'
S. Rep. No. 91-617,
p. 158 (1969) (emphasis added).
See also Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 928 (10th Cir.
1987)

("Sedima thus makes clear that a RICO violation requires

continuous

and

related

racketeering

Thompson v. Wyoming Alaska, Inc.f

acts")

(emphasis

added);

652 F. Supp. 1222, 1224 (D.

Utah 1987) (same); Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, supra, 645 F.
Supp. at 425-26 (same).
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that continuity
and relationship remain the touchstones for establishing a "pattern" under RICO.
492

U.S.

229

H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,

(1989).

The

Supreme
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Court's

analysis

of

the

"pattern"

of

racketeering

necessary

for

a

viable

RICO

claim

applies with equal force to the "pattern" of unlawful activity
required under the UPUAA.
UPUAA

explicitly

Indeed, the statutory language of the

incorporates

relationship articulated

the

elements

of

continuity

and

by the Court in Sedima and now reaf-

firmed in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell, supra.

Section 1602(2)

defines a "pattern" of unlawful activity to mean:
(1) the commission
criminal episodes;

of

at

least

three

(2) those episodes must be related, not
isolated;
(3) taken together, the episodes must
demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(3) (1988 Supp.) (Emphasis added).
Because the Second Amended Complaint is devoid of any
allegation of the requirement of continuity and relationship, it
fails to state a legally cognizable "pattern."

The trial court

correctly dismissed the Racketeering Claims.
4.

The Trial Court Properly Excluded Any Evidence of
the Franchisee/s Alleged Loss of Profits.

The Franchisee argues that the trial court erred
excluding evidence of lost profits.

in

(Appellee's Brief at 60-63).

The court's decision, however, is warranted for several reasons.
First, the Franchisee

failed

to plead

an entitlement

profits in the manner required by Utah law.
-33-

to

lost

Rule 9(g) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "when items of special
damages are claimed, they shall be specifically stated,"

If they

are not specifically stated, it is reversible error to award such
damages.

Graham v. Street, 270 P.2d 456 (Utah 1954),

Like most

jurisdictions, Utah treats lost profits as an item of special
damage

because

they

are

not

a

necessary,

result of an alleged breach of contract.

natural

or

routine

Cohn v. J.C. Penney

Co., 537 P.2d 306, 311 (Utah 1975); Security Title Co. v. Hunt,
337 P.2d 718, 719-20 (Utah 1959); Graham v. Street, 270 P.2d at
459.

As such, the party against whom lost profits are sought is

entitled to clear notice of that claim.

Id.

In the face of these principles, the Franchisee concedes that nowhere in the 250 pages of his initial Complaint, his
two Amended Complaints or his More Definite Statement is there
any express mention of his intent to seek damages for lost profits.

(Appellee's Brief at 60) .

To rationalize that omission,
the Franchisee points to a brief snippet of a single paragraph 10
of his Second Amended Complaint.

_Id.11

That paragraph appears

in the Franchisee's conversion claim—a claim that seeks damages

10

The Franchisee in his brief mistakenly refers to this paragraph (paragraph 13 9) as page 13 9.
11

Paragraph 139 alleges in pertinent part that the Franchisor
recklessly or intentionally failed to pay commissions and
". . . wrongfully obtained an injunction prohibiting plaintiff
from servicing his accounts." (Tr. at R. 1369).
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for the Franchisor's alleged failure to properly compute and pay
earned and accrued sales commissions.

The conversion claim does

not seek damages for future lost profits.

Indeed, paragraph 141

of the Second Amended Complaint alleges that as a result of the
Franchisor's

"intentional

conversion," the

Franchisee

suffered

". . . injury and damages in an amount equal to the commissions
which should have been paid, the correct and agreed-to charges
for

parts

and

materials,

(emphasis added).

and

interest

thereon."

(R.

137 0)

Neither that nor any other paragraph alleges a

right to unpaid income beyond "the commissions which should have
been paid."

Because the only unpaid income to which the Franchi-

see claims an entitlement are the very sales commissions that the
jury awarded him on his conversion and breach of contract claims,
the Franchisee has been

fully

compensated

for all

losses for

which he pleaded.
In addition, the Franchisee's reliance on the allegation

that

the

Injunction

was wrongfully

issued

is unavailing

given the trial court's ultimate determination that it was not.
The Franchisee concedes this fact in his brief.

(See Appellee's

Brief at 61: "The Court refused to grant damages to [the Franchisee] as a result [of] his request for declaratory relief for what
apparently was the Court's finding that the injunction was not
wrongfully entered.")

The moment the injunction was determined
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not to have been wrongfully issued, therefore, the only arguably
pleaded basis for the recovery of lost profits vanished. 12
even

if the Franchisor had properly pleaded

a claim

for

Thus,
lost

profits flowing from the issuance of the Injunction, the court's
conclusion that the Injunction was not wrongfully

issued pre-

cludes an award of lost profits.
5.

The Franchisee's Failure to Adduce Any Evidence of
the Franchisor's Financial Net Worth is Fatal Both
to the Jury's Punitive Damage Award of $5f872.36
and to the Recovery of Any Additional Punitive
Damages.
(a)

Punitive

The Court Should Strike the $5,872.36 Award.
damages

are

available

under

Utah

law

only

where there is "willful and malicious conduct or conduct which
manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of others."

Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospi-

tal, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983).

Of the many factors

to be considered in assessing the amount of punitive damages, the
cases uniformly identify the relative wealth of the defendant as
among

the

most

important.

See

e.g.

Crookston

v.

Fire

Ins.

Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991); Bundy v. Century Eguipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705

12

That the Injunction was not wrongfully issued and, indeed,
should have been made permanent is established in Appellant's
Brief at 46-48, and Appellant's Reply Brief, supra at 20-22.
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P.2d 766, 771 (Utah 1985).

If the record is devoid of evidence

of the defendant's relative wealth, punitive damages are not sustainable.

Bundy, 692 P.2d at 759; Nelson v. Jacobson# 669 P.2d

1207, 1219 (Utah 1983) (".

. . the award of $25,000 in punitive

damages in this case could not be sustained in any event because
it was entered without adducing any evidence or making any findings of fact regarding defendant's net worth or income."); Cruz
v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) (where there was no evidence
of defendant's assets or net worth, punitive damages imposed by
jury could not stand).
In this case, the Franchisee adduced no evidence of the
Franchisor's net worth, despite the fact that the trial court
expressly ruled that to the extent he was able to establish a
prima facie case for the imposition of such damages, he could
present such evidence to the jury.
chisee simply

forgot to do so.

(Tr. at R. 4318).
The Court should

The Franaccordingly

strike the punitive damage award of $5,872.36.
(b)

The Court Should Not Grant a New Trial Solely
on the Issue of Punitive Damages.

The Franchisee argues for a new trial solely on the
issue of punitive damages.

(Appellee's Brief at 65).

hopelessly

uneconomical

unrealistic

and

remedy

in

This is a
this

case.

Given the factual and legal complexity of the parties' claims and
defenses and the remarkable extent to which the parties claim the
-37-

trial court erred at almost every stage of the litigation, a separate trial
sense.

solely

on the issue of punitive damages makes no

This case can be coherently adjudicated only through a

plenary trial of all issues.
the

many

factors

relevant

Such an adjudication must consider
to

assessing

the

availability

and

amount of punitive damages: (i) the relative wealth of the defendant; (ii) the nature of the alleged misconduct; (iii) the facts
and

circumstances

surrounding

such

conduct;

(iv)

the

effect

thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and others; (v) the probability of future occurrence of the misconduct; (vi) the relationship

of the parties; and

awarded.

Crookston

v.

(vii) the

Fire

amount

Ins. Exchange,

of
817

actual
P. 2d

damages
at

8 08;

Bundy, 692 P.2d at 759.
It is clear, therefore, that any determination of punitive damages will require an extensive and complicated assessment
of

hotly

disputed

Franchisor's

evidence

conduct, the

regarding

facts

and

the

quality

circumstcinces

of

the

surrounding

that conduct and the relationship between the parties.

These

assessments cannot be made in a vacuum devoid of these vitally
important factors.

The Franchisee's suggestion that the Court

simply grant a new trial solely on the issue of punitive damages
is plainly impractical.

The Franchisee will have to reestablish

and meaningfully summarize all of the evidence relevant to his
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claim for punitive damages.
have

to

claim.

adduce

extensive,

The Franchisor will of necessity
additional

evidence

to

rebut

that

Much of this evidence—such as the Franchisor's financial

condition, the nature of the alleged misconduct, the facts and
circumstances

surrounding

such conduct

and

the probability

of

future occurrence of the misconduct—has not yet been developed
given the trial court's decision to bifurcate and defer the issue
of punitive

damages.

The presentation

require untold days of trial time.
judicial economy would be thwarted

of such evidence will

The salutary objectives of
by conducting

a bifurcated

trial on punitive damages separate from a new trial on the many
. .

13

issues of liability and compensatory damages.

See Van Dyke v.

Mountain Coin Machine, Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 966 (Utah App. 1988)
(new trial should not be ordered where it is not efficient or
economical to do so).

13

Of course, it is the Franchisor's position that the trial
court committed so many reversible errors at almost every conceivable point in this proceeding as to require a new trial of
all issues in the case. If all issues need to be retried, considerations of judicial economy become irrelevant. Those considerations are relevant, however, in evaluating the appropriateness
of a new trial solely on the issue of punitive damages.
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6.

The Trial Court Properly Refused to Grant
Franchisee's Motions for Directed Verdict,
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and
Declaratory Relief.

the
for
for

In ruling on motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
the trial court is obliged to look at the
evidence and all reasonable inferences that
fairly may be drawn therefrom in the light
favorable to the party moved against; and the
granting of such a motion is justified only
if, in so viewing the evidence, there is no
substantial basis therein which would support
a verdict in his favor. On appeal, in considering the trial court's granting of such
motions, we look at the evidence in the same
manner.
Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson,
(Utah 1979).

604 P.2d

913, 917

Importantly, in order "to demonstrate that the evi-

dence is insufficient to support the jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when

viewed

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

verdict."

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d at 799.
The Franchisee ignores these principles.
lip

service

to

the proposition

that

his motions

While paying
".

. . are

reviewable under a clearly erroneous standard" that require him
to marshal the evidence, see Appellee's Brief at 65, the Franchisee argues with no citation to the record that "the only way to
bring

sanity

and

consistency

to
-40-

contractual

relations" is to

apply the principle that a prior breach of a mutually dependent
contract obligation excuses performance of the reciprocal obligation.

.Id. at 66.
In

ignores

making

a crucial

this

argument,

fact: he adduced

however,

the

no evidence and

Franchisee
otherwise

failed to demonstrate that his obligation to honor the confidentiality provisions of the Franchise Agreements was dependent or
conditional

upon the

Franchisor's

amount of earned sales commissions.

obligation

to pay

the

full

Indeed, the Franchise Agree-

ments belie the possibility of a finding that these obligations
are

dependent

or

conditional

on

each

other.

Paragraph

14(a)(iv)(d) of the Franchise Agreements provide in unmistakable
terms that the Franchisee's obligation to maintain the confidentiality of the Franchisor's customer

information survives even

the termination of the balance of the Agreement.

Moreover, para-

graph 8 of the Agreements—entitled "Obligations of Franchisee"—
nowhere states that the Franchisor's performance of its obligations is a condition to its right to enforce the Franchisee's
obligations, generally, or the Franchisee's confidentiality obligations, specifically.
ties'

respective

Under the Agreements, therefore, the par-

obligations

are

independent,

divisible

nants, not mutually dependent or conditional covenants.

cove-

As such,

the Franchisor's failure to pay all earned sales commissions does
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not excuse the Franchisee's obligation to maintain the confidentiality of the Franchisor's customer information.
This is consistent with Utah law: "A simple statement
or stipulation in a contract is not necessarily a condition to a
party's duty of performance.
a

contract

must

appear

The intent to create a condition in

expressly

or

by

clear

Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 953 (Utah 1978).

implication."
Indeed, the

law is settled that language of a contract will be

construed

wherever possible cis a covenant and not as a condition.

Restate-

ment (Second) of Contracts, § 227(1) (1981).
Because there is no evidence that the Franchisor's general contractual obligations were anything other than independent
of, and divisible from, the Franchisee's obligation to maintain
the

confidentiality

of

the

Franchisor's

customer

information,

there is no legal basis for the Franchisee's clciim that the Court
should simply strike the damages award on the Franchisor's counterclaim.

The

Court

should

either

affirm

the

trial

court's

treatment of this issue or remand for a new tricil of all issues.
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7.

The Trial Court Properly Determined that the Franchisee was not the Prevailing Party for Purposes
of Recovering Attorneys7 Fees. 1 4

The Franchisee's reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56
as a basis for an award of attorneys7 fees in this case is misplaced.

That section provides that the Court shall award attor-

neys 7 fees to a prevailing party

7/

. . . if the Court determines

that the . . . defense to the action was without merit and not
.

. . asserted in good faith. . . .77

Straining to meet those

criteria, the Franchisee then hypothesizes that:
If a Plaintiff can convince a jury of all of
the relief awarded to [the Franchisee] in
this action for [the Franchisor7s] tortious
and bad faith conduct, including an award of
punitive damages, he clearly [is entitled to
attorneys7 fees under Section 78-27-56].
The

Franchisee7s

argument

turns

the

statute

on

its

Under the Franchisee7s interpretation, any time a plain-

head.

tiff prevails on a contested claim, he is automatically entitled
to an award of attorneys7 fees.

That interpretation is belied

not only by the clear terms of the statute, but by Utah case law.
In Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151-52
Supreme Court held that the term
with

77

frivolous."

(Utah 1983), the Utah

77

without merit77 was synonymous

The Court also held in Cady

14

that to establish

To support this argument, the Franchisor incorporates by
reference all of the points and authorities set forth in Appell a n t s Brief at 38-39 and Appellant7s Reply Brief supra at 13-16.
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lack of "good faith," the prevailing party must establish either
(i) the
defense,

absence

of

(ii) an

an honest belief

intent

to

take

in the propriety

unconcsionable

of the

advantage,

(iii) an intent to hinder, delay or defraud another.

Ld.

or

if the

evidence fails to ". . . affirmatively establish a lack of at
least one of the three elements of good faith," id. at 152, there
is no basis for the imposition of attorneys' fees under the statute.
The

Franchisee's

contention

that

the

Franchisor's

defense was "without merit" and was "asserted in bad faith" completely ignores a number of vitally important, undisputed facts:
(1)

The Franchisee's Second Amended Complaint sought

compensatory and punitive damages of more than $2 5 million.

The

jury

the

awarded

only

$85,000—an

infinitesimal

percentage

of

amount requested.
(2)
Amended

Of the 18 claims for relief asserted in the Second

Complaint, two were dismissed

before trial, nine were

rejected by the jury, and only seven were validated by the jury.
The Franchisor, therefore, prevailed on eleven of the original 18
claims.
(3)

The jury awarded the Franchisor over $15,000 of

damages on its counterclaim—a counterclaim that arose out of the

-44-

same transactions and occurrences alleged in the Second Amended
Complaint.
(4)

The trial court awarded the Franchisor an addi-

tional "equitable" amount of $11,014.
(5)

The trial court awarded the Franchisor attorneys'

fees of $7,564.50 on its successful defense of the Racketeering
Claims.
(6)

Beyond the Racketeering

Claims, the trial court

determined that neither party, under the circumstances of this
case, could be the "prevailing party" for the purpose of attorneys' fees.
(7)

The trial court determined that the Injunction was

not improperly issued.
Whatever else may be said about the validity of the
many claims and defenses, the trial court's final disposition of
this case was a decidedly mixed bag of partial successes and partial failures for the parties.

After they generated thousands of

pages of pleadings and papers, conducted thirteen months of discovery and suffered through five days of trial and innumerable
post-verdict hearings, neither party could claim complete success.

The Franchisee's suggestion that the Franchisor's defense

was somehow

frivolous and

asserted
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in bad

faith

ignores this

reality.

There is no basis for awarding attorneys' fees to the

Franchisee under § 78-27-56 or any other statute or contract.
8.

The Trial Court's Award of an Equitable Payment of
$11,014 is not Assailable on the Basis That the
Franchisee "Fully Performed his Obligations Under
the Contracts."115

In an effort to eliminate the "equitable" payment of
$11,014, the Franchisee argues that because he supposedly "fully
performed his obligations under the contracts," the Franchisor is
not entitled to the payment.

(Appellee's Brief at 69.)

argument, however, misrepresents the record.
determine

that the Franchisee

under the parties' contracts.

That

The jury did not

fully performed

his

obligations

Indeed, the jury determined that

the Franchisee breached his contractual obligations to maintain
the confidentiality of the Franchisor's customer information for
which damages of $10,000 were awarded and willfully converted the
Franchisor's
awarded.

property

for

which

damages

of

over

$5,000

were

The equitable payment, therefore, cannot be vacated on

the basis that the Franchisee suggests.

15

As demonstrated in Appellant's Brief at 46-48 and Appellant's Reply Brief at 20-22, supra, the trial court's award of an
equitable payment of $11,014 as a substitute for making final the
Preliminary Injunction is not sustainable on appeal. However, if
this Court concludes that the equitable payment is a valid substitute for the entry of a permanent injunction, the payment
should be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should vacate the
Franchisee's Judgment and remand this case for a new trial of all
issues identified by the Franchisor.
DATED this

'4

day of December, 1992.
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Cross-Appellee
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